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INTRODUCTION
On a bus in West Philadelphia, a woman feeds her baby an artificial orange beverage from his bottle. The drink costs much less
than baby formula, partly because it is mostly comprised of corn—
1
the largest beneficiary of U.S. agricultural subsidies. Currently the
least expensive food available is also the most caloric and the least
nutritious: a dollar’s worth of cookies or potato chips yields 1200
2
calories, while a dollar’s worth of carrots yields only 250 calories.
A savvy shopper seeking to satiate her family will naturally seek out
3
these more caloric but less nutritious items. The sticker price is a
small fraction of the true cost of highly processed foods, which
contain excessive amounts of sodium, fat, and calories that contri-

1

From 1995 to 2010 the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided
$77,123,770,222 in subsidy payments for corn, the largest of all subsidized crops. Envtl.
Working Grp., The United States Summary Information, 2011 FARM SUBSIDY DATABASE,
http://farm.ewg.org/region?fips=00000&regname=UnitedStatesFarmSubsidySummary
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011). Americans spend 6.8% of their income on food—down from
29% a century ago, far less than industrialized nations such as France and Japan whose
citizens spend approximately 14% of their income on food. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 853 tbl.1358 (2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/11statab/intlstat.pdf.
2
Adam Drewnowski & SE Specter, Poverty and Obesity: The Role of Energy Density
and Energy Costs, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 6, 9 (2004).
3
See HEATHER SCHOONOVER & MARK MULLER, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY,
FOOD WITHOUT THOUGHT: HOW THE U.S. FARM POLICY CONTRIBUTES TO OBESITY 8
(2006) (“Studies have demonstrated that price plays a major role in people’s food purchasing decisions. For many people, purchasing cheaper foods may not be a matter of
choice. But even for those who can afford different options in their food purchases,
price often drives choices.”); Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 11 (“There is substantial evidence that food purchases are influenced by food costs . . . . We hypothesize
that consuming energy-dense foods, and energy-dense diets, is an important strategy
used by low-income consumers to stretch the food budget.”).
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4

bute to an estimated $147 billion in annual healthcare costs.
Moreover, these products are artificially cheap because their production is subsidized with tens of billions in taxpayer funds each
5
year. Federal agricultural subsidies have provided Americans with
high-calorie, low-nutrient processed foods that are less expensive
6
and more readily available than whole grains and produce. Until
very recently, poverty was associated with emaciated faces and railthin limbs, but today malnutrition persists despite an abundance of
7
cheap calories. Our nation is in the midst of an obesity epidemic
that is not only a question of weight, but also implicates serious
health conditions caused by poor nutrition such as heart disease,
8
diabetes, and some types of cancers. The next generation of
4

Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payerand Service-Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF. w822, w828 (2009), http://
content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/5/w822.full.pdf+html?sid=8e3da08f-804a-4e9abdb5-ba052755032e; see also B. Sherry et al., Vital Signs: State-Specific Obesity Prevalence
Among Adults—United States, 2009, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 951, 952
(2010) (reporting that obese individuals spend $1429 more on healthcare annually
than nonobese people).
5
See Envtl. Working Grp., USDA Subsidies for Farms in United States Totaled
$246,718,000,000 from 1995 Through 2009, 2011 FARM SUBSIDY DATABASE, http://
farm.ewg.org/regiondetail.php?fips=00000&summlevel=2&statename=theUnitedStates
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (showing that the United States paid annual subsidies ranging from over $15 billion to nearly $25 billion between 2000 and 2010).
6
See SCHOONOVER & MULLER, supra note 3, at 6-7 (indicating that the cost of fruits
and vegetables has risen forty percent since 1985, while soda, fats, and oils have decreased in price due to “[t]he low cost of commodities like corn and soybeans [which]
make sugars and fats some of the cheapest food substances to produce”); Drewnowski
& Specter, supra note 2, at 14 (“Americans are gaining more and more weight while
consuming more added sugars and fats and are spending a lower proportion of their
income on food”).
7
In 2010 14.5% of American households, or 48.8 million people, were food insecure at some point, meaning those households were uncertain of being able to obtain
enough food to meet the needs of all members. Econ. Research Serv., Food Security in the
United States: Key Statistics and Graphics, USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/
foodsecurity/stats_graphs.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
8
A Surgeon General’s report characterized obesity as an epidemic:
Overweight and obesity may not be infectious diseases, but they have reached
epidemic proportions in the United States . . . . In 1999, an estimated 61 percent of U.S. adults were overweight or obese, and 13 percent of children and
adolescents were overweight. Today there are nearly twice as many overweight
children and almost three times as many overweight adolescents as there were
in 1980 . . . . Approximately 300,000 deaths a year in this country are currently
associated with overweight and obesity.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., THE SURGEON
GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY, at
xiii (2001).
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Americans may be the first in history to have a shorter lifespan
9
than its parents.
The national obesity epidemic is a multifaceted crisis with many
10
factors that go beyond the scope of this Comment. Similarly, the
2008 Farm Bill is omnibus legislation spread across more than a dozen
titles in the United States Code, spanning everything from food
stamps and school lunches to environmental conservation and agri11
cultural research. This Comment evaluates how programs intended
to support farm prices and income influence producers and consum12
13
ers. Commodity production is at the core of the obesity epidemic
because highly processed foods and meats are mostly comprised of
14
15
subsidized corn, soy, and cereal grains. While domestic production

9

See Samuel H. Preston, Deadweight?—The Influence of Obesity on Longevity, 352 NEW
ENGL. J. MED. 1135, 1136-37 (2005) (arguing that the obesity problem in the United
States must be addressed to prevent a reduction in life expectancy).
10
For example, physiological factors such as insulin resistance, psychological factors such as addictive emotional eating, and environmental factors such as sedentary
work, entertainment, and fast-food marketing to children all contribute to food-related
health problems. Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 13. Moreover, individual
taste preference and the cultural importance of certain foods are important factors in
food choice. Id. at 13-14.
11
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651
(codified as amended in scattered titles of the United States Code).
12
Consumer benefits programs—food stamps, school lunches, and the Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)—are also
important components of agricultural policy and public health. See Jess Aldernman et
al., Application of Law to the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 90, 92-94
(2007), for a general discussion of the evolution these programs in response to the obesity epidemic. Congress recently made significant improvements to the school lunch
program by imposing nutritional requirements beyond a minimum caloric content.
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-296, § 208, 124 Stat. 3183,
3221–22 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1779). This and other efforts by
commercial processors to respond to the health crisis discussed below may be attributed to First Lady Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move!” campaign to address childhood
obesity. LET’S MOVE: AMERICA’S MOVE TO RAISE A HEALTHIER GENERATION OF KIDS,
http://www.letsmove.gov (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
13
An agricultural commodity is a crop such as corn, wheat, cotton, rice, soy, oats,
wool, oil, livestock, or frozen concentrated orange juice that is sold on an exchange
market. Commodity Exchange Act § 1a, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2006).
14
See Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that these are the
most high-density foods with the lowest consumption costs). Supporters of agricultural
subsidies contend that the benefits of subsidies go far beyond the farm to everyone involved in the food production and distribution chain. See, e.g., Robert Goodman, A SixPoint Defense of Farm Subsidies, EXTENSION DAILY (Oct. 8, 2004, 1:15 PM),
http://www.aces.edu/department/extcomm/npa/daily/archives/000749.php (“Farmers receive direct benefits, but others along the way benefit indirectly through
cheaper production inputs, which, in turn, contribute to lower production costs.”).
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and food price are not the only factors contributing to the problem,
this Comment questions the value of using the third-largest federal
16
benefits program to reduce the cost of commodities that contribute
17
to $147 billion in annual obesity-related health costs. The issue of
obesity has been well addressed by social scientists and natural scien18
tists, by writers and food advocates. Yet legal scholarship on agriculture has focused entirely on environmental or international trade issues without addressing how federal legislation impacts what farmers
19
decide to plant and what people choose to eat. This Comment recommends legislative action for the 2012 Farm Bill to make fruits,
vegetables, and whole grains comparatively less expensive than unhealthy processed foods and meats.
Part I evaluates past and current legislation that was designed to
impact food production and prices. Farm legislation has focused on
controlling the supply or price of agricultural commodities through
income supports, acreage reduction programs, marketing agreements
15

While many agricultural products are imported, data indicate that U.S. commodity prices significantly influence international market prices, which is why the
World Trade Organization consistently pressures the United States to end agricultural
subsidies. DARYLL E. RAY ET AL., AGRIC. POLICY ANALYSIS CTR., UNIV. OF TENN.,
RETHINKING US AGRICULTURAL POLICY: CHANGING COURSE TO SECURE FARMER
LIVELIHOODS WORLDWIDE 2 (2003), available at http://www.agpolicy.org/blueprint/
APACReport8-20-03WITHCOVER.pdf; see also Review of US Agricultural Policy in Advance
of the 2012 Farm Bill: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 111st Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Daryll E. Ray, Professor, Univ. of Tenn.) (arguing that an “increase in domestic [consumption] has been far more important to U.S. farmers than the vacillation of
grain exports”).
16
Behind Social Security and Medicare, the Farm Bill is the largest federal benefits program (although approximately half of the budget is spent on food stamps,
school lunches, and WIC programs). DAVID RAPP, HOW THE U.S. GOT INTO AGRICULTURE AND WHY IT CAN’T GET OUT 15 (1988).
17
See Finkelstein et al., supra note 4, at w828 (stating that “obesity continues to
impose an economic burden on both public and private payers”).
18
Michael Pollan, Eric Schlosser, and Mark Bittman have done excellent work
connecting health problems to food production. See MICHAEL POLLAN, OMNIVORE’S
DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS (2006) (examining the American
“national eating disorder” by tracing food production from the source to the table);
ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION (2005) (offering a critical account of the development and current state of the American fast food industry); Mark Bittman, A Food
Manifesto for the Future, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Feb. 1, 2011, 10:28 PM), http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/a-food-manifesto-for-the-future (discussing ideas for making the “growing, preparation, and consumption of food healthier,
saner, more productive, less damaging, and more enduring”). However, a legal perspective is required to move from policy points to legislative action.
19
See, e.g., Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 602-13 (2010)
(considering the environmental problems the current agricultural system creates).
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and processing taxes, nonrecourse loans, and direct payments. Each
of these methods is explained and evaluated with respect to how it
creates incentives to plant particular crops. Part II proposes future
legislation to realign production incentives with modern consumption
needs. Part III addresses the potential legal hurdles to implementing
the suggested legislation: whether eliminating benefits programs
might give rise to due process concerns; whether regulating agricultural land use might degrade property values to create a regulatory
takings issue; whether Congress has authority to impose the recommended regulations in light of the Commerce Clause limitations arti20
culated in United States v. Lopez; and whether the tax and spend pow21
ers of Congress may again be relied upon after Wickard v. Filburn.
Price supports and acreage allotments have increased surpluses
and decreased prices; these measures should not continue. In order to
reduce consumption of unhealthy foods and support farm income,
farm payments must be entirely decoupled from production, programs
22
must encourage product diversification, and highly processed foods
must be priced to reflect the true costs they impose on the public.
Agricultural reform can address the food challenges of the twenty-first
century: rather than increase the quantity of available food, agricultural legislation must increase the quality of affordable food. By decoupling income supports, ending acreage reduction and limitation,
and using taxes to impose the true cost of food on processors and consumers, the 2012 Farm Bill can help remedy the obesity epidemic.
I. AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION AND FOOD PRICES
Farm programs were initiated to stabilize crashing farm prices and
support family farmers who would otherwise have been bankrupted in
23
the midst of the Great Depression. However, farm programs have
consistently caused commodity prices to fall, because the support of

20

514 U.S. 549, 601-02 (1995).
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
22
This Comment uses the term polyculture to refer to the agricultural production of
several different kinds of plants or animals. It may include a variety of the same plant—
such as chili peppers, sweet peppers, and ancho peppers—or a variety of species.
23
R. DOUGLAS HURT, PROBLEMS OF PLENTY: THE AMERICAN FARMER IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 67-68 (2002). Government sponsorship of agriculture is older
than the United States. Earl Butz, The Politics of Agricultural Subsidies, PROC. ACAD.
POL. SCI., May 1952, at 54, 55. As early as 1620, tobacco production was limited in Virginia to stabilize falling prices. Id. Most dramatically, the 1862 Homestead Act provided free land to those who farmed and lived on the frontier. Id.
21
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24

program crops encourages their overproduction. The government
guarantees a minimum price for program crops, creating a compelling
incentive to grow more of these crops because government subsidies
25
negate the risk of market collapse. As the supply increases, prices
26
fall. This problem of excess supply was the problem that the first
27
farm bill, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, was intended to
remedy, but the problem of perpetual surplus has persisted through
28
the twenty-first century.
Rather than stabilize minimum farm prices, farm programs have
resulted in decreased commodity prices. The average cost of production is twenty to forty percent below the prices received for program
crops, meaning that commodity subsidies directly contribute up to
29
For example, in 2000 farmers
one-third of the price reduction.
spent an average of $2.72 to produce a bushel of corn with a market
30
value of $1.77. Farmers continue to produce corn because government payments exceed the difference, generating a one percent net
31
income for the farmer regardless of the actual market price. The
reduction in the price of commodity crops has harmed consumers by

24

This Comment uses the term “program crops” to refer to the commodities supported through farm programs. Farm programs do not cover all commodity crops.
“Program crops” are therefore a subset of all commodity crops.
25
Nearly three-fourths of all U.S. cropland is dedicated to production of commodity crops. See INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, THE FARM BILL AND PUBLIC HEALTH: AN
OVERVIEW 2 (2007) (drawing a connection between the high program payments that go
to these crops and the significant portion of cropland dedicated to producing them).
26
Id.
27
Ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31.
28
There are a few notable exceptions to the surplus problem, mostly fueled by government purchase of grain. During World War II and the Korean War, the federal government used grain surpluses to feed troops serving abroad. HURT, supra note 23, at 110.
In 1979, the United States contracted to sell billions of dollars worth of wheat to the Soviet Union, which caused a significant rise in agricultural exports. Id. at 139. Since 1976,
however, most U.S. sales of agricultural commodities have been purely domestic. See
DARYLL E. RAY & HARWOOD D. SCHAFFER, AGRIC. POLICY ANALYSIS CTR., UNIV. OF TENN.,
HOW FEDERAL FARM POLICY INFLUENCES THE STRUCTURE OF OUR AGRICULTURE
2-3 (2005), available at http://www.agpolicy.org/pubs/RaystructuresessionSummary.pdf
(contending that the export theory of agricultural markets has never been realized).
29
RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 15-23. But see Julian M. Alston et al., Farm Subsidies
and Obesity in the United States, AGR. & RESOURCE ECON. UPDATE, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 1, 4
(arguing that the real impact of this price decrease on consumers is minimal and that
the price decrease from price support programs is substantially offset by acreage reduction programs).
30
RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 10.
31
The average difference between the subsidy price that the farmer receives and
the cost of production is approximately one percent. Id. at 10-11.
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32

encouraging overproduction of corn, wheat, rice, and soy. In response to the overabundance of these crops, manufacturers have
found inventive ways to process these commodities, creating unhealthy foods that are highly processed concoctions of many unpronoun33
ceable ingredients created in a lab. Farmers who grow fruits and
vegetables are not subsidized, and are ineligible even for most conser34
vation programs, because they do not grow program crops.
35
Contrary to the legislation’s purpose, agricultural subsidies do
not support small family farmers; real farm income has declined since
36
the 1970s. Further, the majority of subsidy payments goes to large
37
farms with annual revenues of more than half a million dollars.
Thus, both consumers and small family farmers are harmed by the ar38
tificial deflation of commodity prices. Farm Bill reform can provide

32

See, e.g., MARK MULLER ET AL., CONSIDERING THE CONTRIBUTION OF U.S. FOOD
AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY TO THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC: OVERVIEW AND OPPORTUNITIES
21-23 (2007) (connecting the subsidization of poor-quality foods to obesity).
33
See POLLAN, supra note 18, at 18-19 (explaining how technology has put components of corn in nearly every food product—-even other vegetables—-and many nonfood products as well).
34
See DEMECY JOHNSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ELIMINATING FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PLANTING RESTRICTIONS: HOW WOULD MARKETS BE AFFECTED? 19-23 (2006) (explaining that fruit and vegetable farmers must weigh the costs of forgoing payments).
35
Senator Byron Dorgan explained the Farm Bill’s goal of providing a safety net:
If you have a real tough time, price depressions and other things, the big corporate agrifactories, they can make it through there, but the family farms get
washed away. So we developed instead a safety net. That safety net is rooted
in the legislation before us, which incidentally I think improves the safety net.
153 CONG. REC. 13,763 (2007) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan).
36
See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 9 (“Despite these record-level [farm] payments,
net farm income in the U.S. declined 16.5 percent between 1996 and 2001.”). Net
farm income in 2009 was again at 2001 levels after fluctuating significantly from 2004
through 2008 due to large price fluctuations. Econ. Research Serv., Farm Income and
Costs: 2009 Farm Sector Income Estimates, USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/
FarmIncome/2009incomeaccounts.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). Steady increases
in production expenses were also observed from 1999 through 2009. Id.
37
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM FINANCES FOR ALL FARMS:
ALL SURVEY STATES GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS 1-2 (2011).
38
Family farmers are of particular concern because they provide the bulk of agricultural production. See JAMES MACDONALD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GROWING
FARM SIZE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF FARM PAYMENTS 2 (2006) (“Family-operated
farms continue to account for most U.S. agricultural production.”). However, it
should be noted that many family-owned farms are also some of the largest farms in
the country. Id. This Comment specifically addresses “small” family-owned farms because they are crucial to preserving robust domestic agriculture.
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a remedy to the nutrient-scarcity problem that has resulted in an epi39
demic of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease.
A. How Farm Bill Legislation Attempts to Implement Agricultural Policies
Agricultural subsidies focus on “base crops” for pragmatic rea40
sons. The first national system of agricultural supports was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, enacted in response to the Great
41
Depression. The federal government paid farmers for each acre of
42
base crops they took out of production. The initial commodities in43
cluded corn, wheat, rice, cotton, tobacco, milk, and hogs. The government targeted these products because they had significant surpluses and the market demand of these commodities affected the
44
prices of others. For example, the price of corn impacts the price of
beef and poultry, since corn is the primary feed for industrial-scale
meat production. Further, each of the program crops had to be
processed before they reached the consumer, making the inputs easi45
er to regulate. The first farm bill managed the market supply by imposing processing taxes, licensing requirements, and marketing quo46
tas on processors and handlers (such as grain elevators).
This
legislation was among the first New Deal statutes to be declared un-

39

See MULLER ET AL., supra note 32, at 21-27 (concluding that farm subsidies contribute to obesity because they subsidize unhealthy foods). Contra Alston et al., supra
note 29, at 4 (arguing that farm program payments do not significantly impact obesity,
because direct payments have only a small impact on commodity prices and the average consumer does not make purchasing decisions based on such minimal price differences). This Comment disputes Alston’s contention because the impact of farm
subsidies extends beyond cash payments. The incentive to overproduce commodity
crops drives down prices most dramatically. The Alston study further presumes that
acreage reduction offsets price declines due to direct subsidies. Id. Unfortunately,
acreage reduction has virtually no impact on production, as farmers continue to increase yield per acre nearly every year. See infra subsection I.B.2.
40
Base crops originally included corn, wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, and milk. Allen H. Olson, Federal Farm Programs–Past, Present and Future—-Will We Learn from Our
Mistakes?, 6 GREAT PLAINES NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 4 (2001). Now soybeans and grain
sorghum are supported instead of tobacco and milk. There are separate milk programs in the 2008 Farm Bill. 7 U.S.C. §§ 8771–73 (Supp. III 2010).
41
See Butz, supra note 23, at 55.
42
HURT, supra note 23, at 69.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Olson, supra note 40, at 3-4.
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47

constitutional. However, it was not the tax itself that was deemed unconstitutional in Butler v. United States, but the fact that the proceeds of
the tax funded payments to farmers who reduced the acreage used to
48
produce commodity crops. This regulation of production was held to
be an exclusively local concern, and beyond Congress’s Commerce
49
Clause authority. Six years later the Supreme Court in Wickard v. Filburn overruled Butler and declared that the Commerce Clause reaches
50
any commodity that impacts national commerce in the aggregate.
In response to Butler, agricultural legislation focused on nonre51
course loans, and acreage reduction was reframed as soil conserva52
53
tion. These measures remain cornerstones of agricultural supports.
Although the base crops shifted slightly over time—soybeans and
oil seeds replaced tobacco, milk, and hogs—agricultural
supports continued to focus on attempts to limit the supply of com54
In order to reform the current
modity crops to drive up prices.
system of subsidies, it is important to understand the legislative mechanisms for influencing agricultural production and to consider
which statutory measures may be more or less successful in reducing
the cost of fresh produce and increasing the relative cost of highly
processed nonnutritious foods. The central problem of agriculture is
that, unlike other industries, efficiency gains can ultimately reduce
profits because increased production results in surpluses that drive
55
down market prices.
47

See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936) (“Congress has no power to
enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing
and spending to purchase compliance.”).
48
Id. at 70.
49
Id. at 64.
50
317 U.S. 111, 113 (1942). See Section III.B for a full discussion of congressional
authority to regulate agricultural production under the Commerce Clause.
51
See infra subsection I.B.4.
52
See, e.g., Butz, supra note 23, at 56. Indeed, the 1936 legislation was titled the
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. Pub. L. No. 74-461, 49 Stat. 163 (1936)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 590 (2006)). The Soil Act avoided invalidation
because the Court in Butler held environmental protection to be a legitimate federal
object. 297 U.S. at 84.
53
See infra Section I.B.
54
RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34696, THE 2008 FARM BILL: MAJOR PROVISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION 11 (2008).
55
See generally HURT, supra note 23, at 134 (arguing that the agricultural industry,
unlike other industries, does not generate more income for producers as efficiency
increases because increased production creates surpluses that in turn drive down prices). The gains in agricultural efficiency relative to manufacturing industries are stag-

FOSTER_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Subsidizing Fat

11/8/2011 12:58 PM

245

B. Principal Methods of Price Control
There are two calamities that confront farmers. One is crop fail56
ure due to drought or other natural disasters. The federal government provides disaster crop insurance to farmers suffering from crop
57
failure. The other is an overabundance of crops due to increased
58
yields or overplanting. This drives down prices for the commodity,
often below the cost of inputs the farmer has spent to raise and harv59
est the crop. When surpluses cause commodity prices to fall, federal
price and income supports supplement the market price farmers rece60
ives, encouraging continued production despite negative returns. In
fact, in recent years government payments have accounted for the ma61
jority or all of net income for some farms. This problem has persisted through all price support methods, from acreage reduction and
62
nonrecourse loans to target prices and deficiency payments. In the
63
1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act Congering: agricultural production efficiency increased 330% from 1952 to 1972, while
manufacturing efficiency increased by 160% during the same period. These efficiencies are found in new machinery, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and genetically
engineered crops. JIM HIGHTOWER, FOOD, FARMERS, CORPORATIONS, EARL BUTZ . . .
AND YOU, AGRIBUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 1 (1973); see also POLLAN, supra note
18, at 95-99 (discussing how food demand is inelastic because it is limited to the capacity of human food consumption and that in response food processors have created new
“value-added” foods).
56
MULLER ET AL., supra note 32, at 16.
57
Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1524 (2006).
58
For example, when corn production reached an all-time high in 2009, average
corn prices fell thirty-six cents from 2008 prices, fifty cents less than 2007 prices. NAT’L
AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CROP VALUES 2009 SUMMARY 21 (2010).
59
See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 10 (showing that in 2003 it cost $2.72 to produce
a bushel of corn, but the price per bushel was $1.77); see also HIGHTOWER, supra note
55, at 4 (noting that even during the 1970s export boom, commodity prices were up
6% since 1952, but input costs had increased 122%).
60
Income supports were intended to maintain domestic agricultural production,
but since payments are tied to production, they have the same impact on planting
choices as price supports. See FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DIRECT AND
COUNTER-CYCLE PAYMENTS PROGRAM 1-2 (2008) (outlining commodities eligible for
direct and countercyle payment programs).
61
MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at 2; see also, e.g., RAPP, supra note 16, at 31
(explaining that when target prices were paid during the price collapse of the 1980s,
fifty-seven percent of farm income was derived from government payments in 1988, up
from seven percent just eight years earlier); RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 2 (“For
grain farmers, government payments can—depending on the year—-represent all (or
more than all) of their net farm income.”).
62
Olson, supra note 40, at 22-23.
63
Pub. L. No. 104 -127, 110 Stat. 888 (codified as amended in scattered titles of
the United States Code).
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gress attempted to transition farmers to the free market by offering
production contracts that would support income after price supports
64
were eliminated. However, the 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills returned to
65
income supports, price supports, and acreage reduction programs.
1. Income Supports
Income supports differ from price supports because, unlike price
66
supports, income supports are not intended to impact production.
Rather, income supports are designed to provide farming families
67
The famous
with incomes comparable to non-farming families.
Brannan Plan of 1949 first conceived of income supports through tar68
get prices, which were not implemented until the Agriculture and
69
Consumer Protection Act of 1973. Crop prices were subsidized by
the difference between the market price and the price that would
70
raise incomes to the level of nonfarm workers, called “parity prices.”

64

Daryll Ray has argued that agricultural production, particularly grain
production, has a very low response rate to prices. Daryll E. Ray, Dir., Agric. Policy
Analysis Ctr., Univ. of Tenn., Testimony Before the Democratic Policy Committee,
1996 Farm Bill: A Price Response Experiment 2-4 (Feb. 2, 2000), available at http://
www.agpolicy.org/pubs/fbtest0200.PDF. He attributed this problem to the fact that
agricultural land remains in production, even when individual farmers go out of business, so the overall supply is not significantly affected. Id. at 1. Three years later he
wrote that while the same amount of land remained in production after Canada reduced commodity supports by thirty-five percent, the mix of crops grown had changed
significantly. RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 40. The Canadian outcome is a goal of this
Comment’s legislative recommendations.
65
See infra subsection I.B.5 for a discussion of the retreat from reform in the 2002
and 2008 Farm Bills.
66
See Olson, supra note 40, at 9 (explaining that an income support would calculate subsidization based on the size of a typical farm family).
67
Id.
68
See Reo M. Christenson, THE BRANNAN PLAN: FARM POLITICS AND POLICY 64 -72
(1959) for a general discussion of Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan’s reform
proposals. The Brannan Plan differed from the 1973 Act in that it sought to expand
supports beyond the base commodities to include fruits and vegetables. See Olson, supra note 40, at 9 (discussing direct payments for fruits and vegetables included in the
Brannan Plan). The programs imposed limits both on the maximum benefit amount
and farm size in an effort to direct supports to small family farms.
69
Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
7 U.S.C.).
70
Parity prices are a measure of the purchasing power of commodity prices. Olson, supra note 40, at 1. Agricultural supports use an index of input costs and consumer prices to set target agricultural prices. Typically, a program will support prices between seventy and ninety-two percent of parity prices to ensure sufficient income to
keep a family farm in business. See, e.g., HURT, supra note 23, at 108 (explaining that
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Target prices were set at average prices over the previous ten years,
and when the market price fell below the target price, farmers could
71
receive the difference in a “deficiency payment.” While deficiency
payments are no longer in use, target payments are used to calculate
72
market loan rates and “countercycle” payments. Countercycle pay73
ments are made when market prices fall below target prices. Market
74
loans are nonrecourse loans (the crop serves as collateral) to farmers
who do not sell at lower prices during harvest time, but keep their
75
crop off of the market until prices rise later in the season.
While these supports are styled as “income” supports, payments
are still based on the amount of program crops that farmers produce.
These supports artificially deflate prices because farmers can afford to
accept prices below the cost of production since the farm programs
76
pay them the difference. This is a significant contributor to the explosion of cheap processed foods and meats, as confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) can purchase feed grains for less than the
77
cost of growing and harvesting them. Thus, it is more expensive to
raise animals fed on crops grown on the same farm than it is to raise
cattle in a confined feedlot with purchased grain. This increases the

Secretary Brannan believed this method would encourage farmers to produce at a rate
that would create ideal commodity prices).
71
See id. at 133 (explaining that after the initial year, target prices were based on
the previous year’s target price and adjusted by production levels and an index of input costs). Deficiency payments were capped at the difference between the target
price and the nonrecourse loan rate. Id. Olson notes that the target price is “referred
to by some economists as a ‘what ought to be price.’” Olson, supra note 40, at 13.
72
See JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 11 (noting significant increases in countercycle
and market loan supports from the 2002 to the 2008 Farm Bill).
73
Countercycle payments are calculated by taking the product of the farm’s yield
under the countercycle payment program, the payment rate, and eighty-five percent of
the farm’s acreage used to grow base crops . FARM SERV. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 1.
74
See infra subsection I.B.4 for a complete discussion of nonrecourse loans.
75
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., MARKETING ASSISTANCE LOANS & LOAN
DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS 1-2 (2008), available at www.usda.gov/documents/Marketing_
Assistance_Loans_and_Loan_Deficiency_Payments.pdf.
While a program with the
name “deficiency payment” still exists, it is a fundamentally different program because
it is not linked to target prices. Id. at 1. Current loan deficiency payments provide
farmers with a payment to keep their crops off an overcrowded market, instead of using their crops as collateral in a market loan. Id.
76
See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 10-11 (showing that corn prices are 23% lower
than the cost of production and farm payments provide 24% of the farmer’s revenue,
generating 1% net income on corn production).
77
See RAPP, supra note 16, at 31 (“For both crop prices and farm income federal
subsidies now play the dominant role in determining how much of certain commodities will be produced and what prices they will bring at market.”).
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trend toward large industrial farms and away from diverse farms that
78
raise both crops and animals.
Allowing prices to fall without income supports has consistently
resulted in increased production in the short term as farmers scram79
ble to make up the difference in revenues with greater volume. One
of the reasons that crop prices plummeted in the wake of the 1996
FAIR Act is that farmers had become significantly invested in mono80
81
culture and could not easily respond to market conditions. For example, when the FAIR Act sought to decouple price supports from
production, commodity prices dropped 15.5%, but production of the
82
eight major crops only decreased by 3.7% over the same period.
Lack of diversification has been identified as a major inhibitor to
market response, because farms engaged in monoculture cannot re83
spond to a change in price by changing the crops in production.
Thus, farmers have continually increased sunk costs in equipment in
order to decrease per-unit costs, becoming more beholden to the
same commodities with each capital investment. The ability of wellcapitalized farms to reduce per unit costs is one of the reasons industrial agriculture has thrived in the past decade. The fall in price due
to increased production does not impact the return because farm
84
programs guarantee a minimum price.

78

See RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 3 (arguing that large farms generally benefit from policy decisions aimed to assist small farms).
79
HURT, supra note 23, at 107.
80
See POLLAN, supra note 18, at 38-40 (discussing the rise of monoculture and its
impacts on food production and farming practices).
81
See RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 2-4 (describing the economic policies and
technological advances that lead to the concentration of agriculture in a small number
of large farms specializing in a small number of crops); see also Mary Clare Ahearn et
al., How Do Decoupled Payments Affect Resource Allocations Within the Farm Sector?, AMBER
WAVES, Nov. 2004, at 8, 8 (explaining that government subsidies distort market responses because farmers do not exclusively consider input costs and market prices, but
also factor government payments in their production decisions).
82
Ray, supra note 64, at 1-2.
83
Cf. RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 4 (explaining that industrial farms are
highly invested in technology designed for one particular crop).
84
See MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at 2 (showing agricultural production
shifting to larger farms).
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2. Acreage Reduction
The purpose of acreage reduction is to reduce production by con85
trolling a principal agricultural input: land. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 sought to reduce the acreage in production
86
through voluntary agreements with farmers who received payments
from the Department of Agriculture to reduce the acres on which
87
they grew basic crops. By 1937 it was clear that reducing acreage did
not actually reduce the crop supply because farmers increased the
88
productivity of the acres remaining in production. While there ultimately may be some limit on how much corn a farmer can physically
grow on a single acre of land, farm productivity has continued to in89
crease, with the greatest production per acre in history in 2009. Un85

However, increasing other inputs nullifies these efforts. See, e.g., WAYNE D.
RASMUSSEN & GLADYS L. BAKER, THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 110 (1972) (“A
price-support system relying on acreage limitation can be rendered ineffective by
technological progress.”).
86
The Supreme Court found the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s “coercive” control
of production, which it considered a purely local concern, to be beyond the scope of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 63-64 (1936). In response, the 1936 Soil Conservation Act continued to limit
acreage on which farmers planted base crops, but did so under the guise of environmental conservation. See Ch. 104, 49 Stat. 163 (1936) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 590) (paying farmers to plant in accordance with “soil conservation” goals, to
fix nutrients to the soil, and to prevent erosion). While conservation has become an
important component of agricultural policy, this Comment discusses these programs
only as they relate to production controls and income supports.
87
See WAYNE D. RASMUSSEN ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AGRIC. INFO. BULLETIN
NO. 39, A SHORT HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT, 1933–75, at 2 (1976) (describing the programs implemented by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933). In
order to address emergency problems in commodity prices before the legislation took
effect, the USDA contracted with farmers to plough under crops that had already been
planted that season and to slaughter sows and cattle. Id. This famous event in agricultural history is often portrayed as a gruesome waste, but lost in this narrative is the detail that products including pork, butter, cheese, and flour were given to unemployed
families struggling to feed themselves during the Great Depression. Id.
88
See id. at 4 (explaining that the 1936 drought concealed the increase in productivity per acre); see also HIGHTOWER, supra note 55, at 1 (noting that agricultural productivity increased 330% from 1952 to 1972, compared to manufacturing productivity
that increased 160% over the same period). The land retired in conservation or allotment programs is typically the least productive, resulting in more intense production on the most productive land. RASMUSSEN & BAKER, supra note 85, at 110. The
only program to focus on actual production levels was the poundage quotas program
implemented in 1965 for flue-cured tobacco. Id.
89
In 2009, corn yield per acre hit an historic high: 165.2 bushels per acre, producing 13.2 billion bushels of corn. See 2009 Crop Year Is One for the Record Books, USDA
Reports, USDA (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/2010/01_
12_2010.asp. These gains in efficiencies resulted from the use of machinery, chemical
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fortunately, the cost of the additional inputs required to realize such
yields reduced farm income, even when agricultural prices were soar90
ing in the 1970s.
3. Marketing Agreements, Processing Taxes, and
Licensing Requirements
Marketing agreements, processing taxes, and licensing requirements focused on processors and handlers of agricultural commodities, such as grain elevators and CAFOs. Legislators targeted commodities requiring processing before human consumption in part because
the production and distribution process allowed for easy monitoring
91
and regulation. Marketing agreements went into effect once twothirds of processors voted in a referendum to limit the total supply,
and the government taxed any amount processed above the limit so
92
heavily that it was essentially confiscated. However, these marketing
agreements and processing taxes were eliminated after the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act was held unconstitutional. These agreements
and taxes were a specific target of the Supreme Court’s decision in
93
United States v. Butler. The Court held that Congress did not have the
fertilizers and pesticides, and genetically modified crops that can withstand cold and
pests. Id.
90
See HIGHTOWER, supra note 55, at 4 (explaining that the average debt of a family
farmer increased 335% between 1952 and 1973). The 1970 Farm Bill altered the
acreage reduction requirements for crops, including wheat, by replacing the per-crop
acreage allotments with a percentage reduction in total cropland. Agricultural Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, sec. 402, § 397(c)(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1358, 1362 (1970); see also
RASMUSSEN & BAKER, supra note 85, at 111 (noting that the bill abolished marketing
quotas for corn, wheat, and cotton). Although certain crops, such as rice, peanuts,
sugar, and tobacco, were still subject to production quotas, the goal was to provide
farmers with greater flexibility in choosing what to plant. Id. However, price supports
were still calculated using the base crop-—the number of acres the farmer planted of
the commodity crop, multiplied by the farm’s average productivity per acre. Olson,
supra note 40, at 21. Thus, removing the allotment barrier to planting different crops
did not affect production because the incentives had not changed. Id. at 22. Another
striking example of this problem is the In-Kind program, which paid farmers to not
plant 50% to 100% of their crops. 7 C.F.R. §§ 770.1–770.6 (1984). The program cut
corn production in half and removed more cropland from use than Western Europe
planted in 1983. Olson, supra note 40, at 16. However, this reduction of supply did
not help the farm depression. In 1985 a record number of farmers filed for bankruptcy, sixty-eight agricultural banks failed, and many equipment and chemical suppliers
went out of business. Id.
91
HURT, supra note 23, at 69.
92
Olson, supra note 40, at 6.
93
The Court reasoned, “Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the
farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow that it
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authority to impose these taxes under the power to tax and spend because they were not imposed to generate revenue but were used to
94
control supply, which was an exclusively local prerogative.
While
Wickard v. Filburn later held that Congress did have authority to regulate wheat production, the Court established this authority under the
95
Commerce Clause, and the taxation method of regulating produc96
tion was not resumed in later years.
4. Nonrecourse Loans
Nonrecourse loans are a cornerstone of modern price supports.
This program creates a price floor by guaranteeing farmers a mini97
mum price for certain commodity crops. The Secretary of Agricul98
ture sets loan rates—essentially a target price—for each commodity.
When market prices fall below the loan rates, farmers can take out a
loan from the government for the value of the crop instead of selling
99
the crop on the market. The crop serves as collateral for the loan,
and the government has a right to the crops if the farmer fails to repay
100
Farmers hold the loan for up to nine months, keeping
the loan.
their crops off an overcrowded market until sufficient demand returns
may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase compliance.” 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936).
94
The Court explained, “Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the Federal
Government.” Id. at 69 (quoting Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 17 (1925)).
95
317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
96
The Soil Conservation Act of 1936 and subsequent farm bills focused on acreage
reduction and price supports rather than processing fees and production limitations to
control supply. See infra Section III.C for a discussion of the possibility of resuming
processing taxes under the Taxing and Spending or Commerce Clause authority.
97
Initially, loans supported the prices of corn, cotton, rice, wheat and tobacco.
RASMUSSEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 6. The 2008 Farm Bill provided price supports to
twenty different crops, including soybeans, oilseeds, additional feed grains, wool, dry
peas, lentils, and the newest crop large chickpeas. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act
of 2008 § 1001(4), 7 U.S.C. § 8702(4) (Supp. III 2010).
98
RASMUSSEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 6.
99
Olson, supra note 40, at 6-7.
100
Originally, the federal government stored the collateral crops for only nine
months. RAPP, supra note 16, at 35. If a farmer failed to repay the loan, the government retained the commodity as part of the “Ever-Normal Granary” program. RASMUSSEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 6. Through this program the federal government
maintained surplus crops that could be sold to normalize supply when scarcity drove
up food prices. Ruth R. Harkin & Thomas R. Harkin, “Roosevelt to Reagan” Commodity
Programs and the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 499, 501 (1982).
However, the program was extremely costly—-the government paid over one million
dollars per day just to store the crops. HURT, supra note 23, at 123.
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101

to drive up prices and warrant the release of more supply.
Loans
102
are typically repaid upon sale at a higher market price.
This cycle
creates a price floor by encouraging farmers to store excess supplies
103
when prices fall below a certain level.
The program sought to control prices by both reducing the incentive to sell at plummeting prices and keeping surplus crops off the
market. The modern program includes market loans and loan deficiency payments that permit farmers to repay loans at market prices if
prices are below the loan rate at the time the loan comes due rather
104
than forfeit the commodity.
These programs were continued
through the 1996 FAIR Act, which sought to transition farmers to the
free market, but continued the same production incentives by main105
taining loan rates at eighty-five percent parity prices.
When the Secretary of Agriculture sets a loan rate that exceeds the
market price a farmer could get for her crops, the only sensible choice
is to take out a loan. There is no penalty for defaulting on these
loans—no negative impact on the farmer’s credit rating or additional
fees imposed—so the loans function essentially as a sale of the grain to
106
the United States government at above-market prices.
Indeed,
banks typically require farmers to participate in the farm program to
qualify for loans to purchase land or equipment because the program
107
guarantees a minimum rate of return even if crop prices plummet.
While nonrecourse loans are referred to as a type of income support, the purpose of these loans is to control prices by limiting the
supply on the market. These loans do not effectively limit supply, because they create a price floor, encouraging farmers to produce more
108
commodity crops because they are guaranteed a minimum price.
Farmers are paid by the bushel, so these programs create incentives to
produce as many bushels per acre as possible regardless of market con109
ditions. This practice ultimately drives down prices.
Further, sup101

RAPP, supra note 16, at 35.
Id.
103
Olson, supra note 40, at 6-7.
104
See supra subsection I.B.1.
105
Olson, supra note 40, at 21.
106
RAPP, supra note 16, at 35.
107
Id. at 32.
108
See Olson, supra note 40, at 22 (arguing that price supports create surpluses).
109
Prices have increased significantly only as a result of global food disasters, such
as the OPEC embargo combined with famine and drought in the 1970s. See id. at 13
(describing the effects of famines in Africa and Asia, a grain deal with the Soviet Union, and the Arab oil embargo on U.S. food prices).
Commodity
102
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porting only base crops promotes excessive production of those commodities at the expense of nonsubsidized crops, like fruits and vegeta110
bles. As a result, reform advocates have urged Congress to adopt in111
come support programs that are “decoupled” from production.
5. Production Flexibility Contracts and Direct Payments
The 1996 FAIR Act attempted to end agricultural production
112
payments.
Also known as the Freedom to Farm Act, the statute
ended deficiency payments and all supply-management programs
113
such as the acreage reduction program and the 50-92 program. To
implement these drastic decreases in farm payments, the statute offered a Production Flexibility Contract, a one-time annual payment
designed to transition farmers to the free market over the course of
114
seven years. Ninety-nine percent of eligible farms enrolled, but only
participants in corn, wheat, cotton, or rice programs in the previous
115
five years were eligible.
The Act based payments on past production with the idea that
farmers would plant more nonprogram crops like fruits and vegeta116
Importantly,
bles when they transitioned to a free market system.

prices are again rising today due to drought in Russia, floods in Australia, and political
unrest in the Middle East. See, e.g., Elizabeth Campbell, Record Beef Price Gains as
Corn Cost Slows Feedlot Cattle Buying, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-18/record-beef-price-gains-as-corn-cost-slowsfeedlot-cattle-buying.html (reporting that grain prices increased by seventy-three percent over the last year and corn futures had the biggest gain in five months).
110
See Olson, supra note 40, at 22-23 (explaining why farmers have little incentive
to grow crops that do not have price supports).
111
See, e.g., Mary E. Burfisher & Jeffrey Hopkins, Farm Payments: Decoupled Payments
Increase Households’ Well-Being, Not Production, AMBER WAVES, Feb. 2003, at 39, 41 (showing that farm families who received decoupled payments during the 1996 FAIR Act had
greater disposable income); Olson, supra note 40, at 28 (arguing that farmers should
not receive payments based on the volume they produced, but should be provided with
the “amount necessary to guarantee a farm family a basic minimum income in times of
low crop or low livestock prices”).
112
See HURT, supra note 23, at 152 (contending that policymakers believed price
supports and acreage reduction programs were the cause of surplus production, vertical integration, and rural poverty).
113
See Olson, supra note 40, at 20-21 (describing the abolishment of various payment structures under the FAIR Act).
114
7 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006); see also HURT, supra note 23, at 152 (explaining how the
FAIR Act provided for a systematic reduction in payments to farmers over seven years).
115
Olson, supra note 40, at 20-21.
116
See Edwin Young & Dennis A. Shields, 1996 FAIR Act Frames Farm Policy for 7
Years, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Apr. 1996, at 1, 1 (“Farmers will have much greater flexibility
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eligibility was based on historic participation in farm programs, and
117
was not dependent on future planting choices. Since payments did
not depend on the amount produced, these were called “decoupled”
payments. Similarly, direct payments, which continue today, were designed to encourage farmers to respond to market conditions rather
than support programs, but eligibility for such payments is still de118
pendent on base-crop acreage.
Decoupling payments from production levels was not successful in
the 1996 FAIR Act, because the reduction in deficiency payments was
made up in market loan and nonrecourse loan payments, which were
119
dependent on production levels. Indeed, from 1996 to 2002, when
income supports comprised two-thirds of farm payments maintaining
the same production incentives, the contract payments constituted a
120
small portion of overall farm payments.
Further, conservation
measures continued acreage-reduction payments, which were contingent on base-crop acreage, so the incentives to overproduce the eight
121
major commodities did not change.
The 1996 Act was further undermined by emergency payments to compensate for natural disasters
122
Contract payments were scheduled to end in
and price collapses.
to make planting decisions . . . .”). However, the FAIR Act did in fact impose planting
restrictions on fruits and vegetables. Id.
117
Id. at 1-2.
118
FARM SERV. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 1.
119
In 1999 the government spent $5 billion on nonrecourse loans. HURT, supra
note 23, at 167. Essentially, market loans replaced the portion of farm income deficiency payments that the government provided before 1996. See Ahearn et al., supra
note 81, at 9 (graphing the proportion of farm payments from 1991 through 2001 to
show the decrease in deficiency and diversion payments in favor of increasing market
loan benefits); see also Olson, supra note 40, at 21 (arguing that the failure to decouple
these other income supports negated the impact of eliminating price supports).
120
Burfisher & Hopkins, supra note 111, at 40.
121
As Allen Olson explains,
By providing larger income subsidies for program crops than for other crops
or livestock, the 1996 farm bill encouraged farmers to keep growing the same
crops they had been growing for years. By 2000, surpluses were again a major
problem. Like other farm bills, the 1996 legislation interfered with the operation of a free market.
Olson, supra note 40, at 24.
To be eligible for the Conservation Reserve Program, a farmer must have planted
base crops in at least four out of the six years between 1996 and 2001. TADLOCK COWAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21613, CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM: STATUS
AND CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2010).
122
However, only ten percent of farms received emergency payments, including
farms owned by Ted Turner, Rockefeller heirs, and wealthy members of Congress who
passed the bill. HURT, supra note 23, at 166-167.
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2002, but the farm bill passed in that year reinstituted price supports
123
and subsidy payments.
C. Current Status of Agricultural Production Legislation
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 and the 2002
124
Farm Bill, both of which perpetuated the same mechanisms of price
control through target prices, countercycle payments, and nonrecourse loans, replaced the FAIR ACT. The scope of these price supports has not extended beyond the core group of base crops, although
125
some legumes and chickpeas are now supported.
No direct aid is
126
provided to producers of fruits and vegetables. In fact, farmers lose
eligibility for nonrecourse loans and conservation programs if they
plant fruits and vegetables instead of program crops, because only
program crops count in the base-acreage calculation used for these
127
benefits.
Most importantly, income supports primarily appear in
the form of nonrecourse loans, which encourage increasing commod128
Thus, the
ity production and discourage product diversification.
largest farms are increasingly the largest beneficiaries of farm programs because the Farm Bill bases payments on the number of pro129
ductive acres and historic yields.
Current agricultural legislation
encourages farmers to plant as many acres of commodity crops as
possible, regardless of the market price, because the government will
make up the difference. This incentive has driven commodity prices
123

This support continued through the 2008 Farm Bill, which defines “base acres”
as “the number of acres established under section 7911 of this title as in effect on September 30, 2007, subject to any adjustment under section 8711 of this title.” 7 U.S.C
§ 8702(2)(A) (Supp. III 2010). However, decoupled income supports have been continued in the form of “direct payments.” Id. § 8702(5).
124
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat.
134 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, and 21 U.S.C.).
125
See JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 11 (noting that in 2009 dry peas, lentils, and large
and small chickpeas were to become eligible for countercycle payments).
126
In fact, fruit and vegetable producers are not eligible for the same disaster relief as farmers who grow commodity crops. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE
2012 FARM BILL: AN OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPORT FARMERS AND PROMOTE PUBLIC
HEALTH 1 (2010), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/20100803flag.pdf.
127
See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 4 (explaining that farms that planted
fruits and vegetables on base acres from 1991 to 2001, excluding 1996 and 1997, may
plant nonprogram crops, but that a farm without a history of planting program corps
violated its contract for direct and countercycle payments and would be penalized for
each acre on which it grew fruits and vegetables).
128
Id. at 10.
129
See MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at 1 (“Commodity program payments
shifted sharply to higher income households between 1989 and 2003.”).
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down, resulting in artificially inexpensive processed foods, while the
130
cost of produce has increased forty percent over the same period.
Federal farm programs make it more expensive for consumers to purchase and consume healthy food.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FARM BILL
Agricultural policy is a story of incentives for both producers and
consumers. Most agricultural legislation has focused on influencing
producers, although the successful discouragement of tobacco use is a
striking example of legislation impacting consumer behavior. To address the obesity epidemic, agricultural legislation must do both.
In order to enable consumers to afford healthier foods while maintaining a strong domestic agricultural system, the 2012 Farm Bill must
consider the actual incentives it creates and use those incentives to support producers and consumers who are both suffering under the current system. Since price supports and acreage allotments have resulted
in increased surpluses and decreased prices, these legislative measures
should not be perpetuated. Further, income supports that are tied to
levels of production have the same effects as price supports. Income
supports should be decoupled from production. Promoting diversification of agricultural production will stabilize farm income without additional government spending. Finally, the new bill should encourage
processors to consider the health impact of their products by imposing
a graded tax, modeled after the tobacco tax system.
A. End Price Supports
Acreage reduction, nonrecourse loans, and deficiency payments
131
have not met their aim of increasing long-term crop prices.
Economists have demonstrated that commodity subsidies, instead of bolstering prices to support domestic agriculture, actually depress farm
132
prices by at least twenty percent.
Further, price supports create a
perverse incentive to invest exclusively in program crops because they
130

The real cost of fruits and vegetables has risen forty percent since 1985, while
soda, fats, and oils have deceased in price. SCHOONOVER & MULLER, supra note 3, at
6-7. The decreasing cost of commodities like corn and soybeans has made “sugars and
fats some of the cheapest food substances to produce.” Id.
131
See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 8 fig.2 (showing that crop prices have on average declined about forty percent).
132
See id. at 10 (demonstrating that market prices for corn, soybeans, cotton, and
rice were between twenty-three and fifty-two percent below cost of production in 2001).
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133

guarantee a minimum return when prices collapse. A better way to
protect farm income against market fluctuations is through decoupled
income supports and encouragement of diversification of agricultural
products.
134
Ending price supports is the simplest legal measure, but this approach was unsuccessful in the 1996 FAIR Act. The 1996 Act attempted
to transition farmers to the free market through an annual income
support payment, but the legislation maintained other forms of support
135
tied to production. In order to effectively end price supports, all farm
payments must be decoupled from production.
Decoupled income supports can provide the appropriate safety net
for farmers in difficult times without significantly influencing farmers’
136
Income supports can thus avert the shortcrop-selection decisions.
term consequence of eliminating price supports, because farmers do
not have to outproduce one another for marginal returns, and can instead focus on crops that have higher market prices. This in turn bolsters market prices for commodity crops by reducing the supply.
Other nations have successfully supported robust agricultural
production after eliminating price supports. In 1995, Canada eliminated thirty-five percent of all commodity supports, which resulted in
a significant change in the mix of crops planted, including a twenty137
three percent decline in wheat, Canada’s principal crop. While the
total land in production did not change significantly, the prices and
138
quantity of individual crops did change.
Similarly, Australia was no
longer able to support its primary agricultural product, wool, in

133

See RAPP, supra note 16, at 35 (describing how nonrecourse loans effectively set
a price floor on commodities).
134
The political challenges of ending price supports present a more difficult question beyond the scope of this Comment. Recently, significant support for farm programs has come from urban representatives whose constituents receive nutrition program benefits. Olson, supra note 40, at 12. Olson suggested that the Food Stamp Act’s
incorporation in the 1962 Farm Bill brought urban support for agricultural benefits.
Id. Since obesity disproportionately impacts low-income urban residents, there may be
room for political consensus on reform, particularly in a time of sharp budget cuts
when other entitlement programs may be reduced. See, e.g., Joe Davidson, Making
Smart Budget Cuts, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2011, at B4 (reporting on recommendations
to more effectively cut budgets of federal agencies).
135
7 U.S.C. §§ 7211, 7231 (2006).
136
See FARM SERV. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 1 (“Because direct payments provide
no incentive to increase production of any particular crop, the payments support farm
income without distorting producers’ current production decisions.”).
137
RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 40.
138
Id.
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139

1991. The number of sheep declined by thirty-one percent, but rather than go out of business, farmers began to plant crops to maintain
140
income. These experiences indicate that farmers are capable of adjusting to market conditions, but they cannot do so when other components of farm programs require continued production of base
crops to receive benefits.
B. Decouple Income Supports from Production Capacity
Currently, the highest-grossing farms are the greatest beneficiaries
141
of farm payments. Deficiency payments are intended to serve as income supports but in fact work on a base-acreage system, meaning
that larger farms benefit more, and farmers who use base acres to
142
plant nonprogram crops are penalized. This creates a strong incentive to plant the same crops and to accept marginal returns because
government programs guarantee a return when the increase in input
costs outpaces commodity prices. Further, countercycle payments are
143
based on average per-acre yields. The USDA calculates countercycle
payments based on the number of acres per farm and the expected
144
average yield per acre. Thus, the farmer who can increase yield per
acre above that average will receive both the value that the government estimates the crop should be sold at and the market value of the
crop that is actually produced.
To maintain a robust national agricultural system, Allen Olson has
suggested providing a minimum guaranteed income to family farms,
145
Under Olregardless of the quantity of program crops produced.
son’s scheme, farm payments would supplement the difference between the family’s income and a $50,000 to $75,000 target income for
families actively engaged in farming. This plan is limited to established farms and excludes hobby farmers, absentee owners, landlords,

139

Id. at 41.
Id. While Professor Ray describes this incident as a failure of eliminating price
supports, such a diversification of agriculture is precisely what this Comment advocates. Indeed, this example shows that farmers can transition to different modes of
production when faced with falling income.
141
See MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at 3 (showing that farms with sales over
half a million dollars were the largest recipient of commodity payments in 2003).
142
See 7 U.S.C. § 8702 (Supp. III 2010) (defining base acres as acres where program crops were grown in previous years).
143
Olson, supra note 40, at 21.
144
FARM SERV. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 1.
145
Olson, supra note 40, at 28.
140
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146

and speculators.
Eliminating incentives to produce program crops,
would give farmers greater liberty to diversify production, particularly
if polyculture were independently encouraged. Further, structuring
income supports around minimum household needs benefits small
147
family farms at the expense of high-grossing industrial farmers.
When farm income is no longer tied to producing program crops,
farmers can focus on higher-value crops, such as fruits and vegetables.
The increased production of fruits and vegetables will in turn make
produce more affordable for consumers.
C. Promote Polyculture
Distributing risk among a variety of crops reduces the overall im148
pact of a price decline in any single product. Diversification reduces
reliance on commodity crops and, in turn, reduces the need for income
149
supports when prices for those crops collapse. In fact, price supports
are linked to the rise of monoculture when farmers shifted from rotating fields through a five-year period to cycling between just corn and
150
soybeans.
This exclusive production of program crops exacerbated

146

Id.
Being well capitalized, large industrial farms are more wedded to monoculture
and focus on increasing production per acre to increase returns. RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 4. These efficiencies of industrial agriculture can only be realized in a
monoculture operation, because reducing per unit cost is dependent on producing
more units of the same crop. See id. at 3-4 (explaining that significant capital expenditures in inputs encourage expanding production and acreage because these fixed costs
reduce operating expenditures, pushing down the per-unit cost of production while
also driving down price at a rate that often outpaces reductions in production costs).
148
See, e.g., Shiva S. Makki et al., Decoupled Payments and Farmers’ Production Decisions
Under Risk, in AGRIC. ECON. REP. NO. 838, DECOUPLED PAYMENTS IN A CHANGING POLICY SETTING 33, 34 (Mary E. Burfisher & Jeffrey Hopkins eds., 2004) (discussing how
farmers use diversification as a risk-management tool).
149
Not every region is capable of supporting diverse crops, however. For example,
many wheat farmers do not have the option of switching to soy or corn because the
high plains region will not support those plants. RAPP, supra note 16, at 32-33. However, farmers in those regions could at a minimum pasture goats or raise chickens to
decrease dependence on commodity crops. Ending price supports that enable feedlots to purchase grain below the cost of production would promote an economically
feasible agricultural model. Diversifying agricultural production with animal husbandry would also challenge the dominance of the confined animal feedlot system, which
has been highly criticized for environmental degradation, animal abuse, and an unbalanced diet focusing excessively on meat products. See, e.g., Bittman, supra note 18 (“It
would be hard to devise a more wasteful, damaging, unsustainable system.”).
150
RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 1.
147

FOSTER_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

260

11/8/2011 12:58 PM

[Vol. 160: 235
151

the surplus problem once the export boom of the 1970s subsided.
152
Further, input costs have exceeded prices, reducing farm income.
Polyculture reduces the need for inputs such as chemical fertilizers,
pesticides, and patented genetically modified seeds because cycling soil
through different uses replenishes nutrients, inhibits annual pests, and
153
improves plant health.
Thus, polyculture reduces dependence on a
single volatile crop market, and increases a farmer’s net income by reducing input costs. Moreover, diversifying agricultural production may
increase the supply of fruits and vegetables while decreasing the supply
of commodity crops, adjusting their prices accordingly.
Congress can encourage polyculture by eliminating acreage limits
154
on nonprogram crops, such as fruits and vegetables, and providing
155
incentives similar to those used in conservation measures.
Just as
farmers are paid “rents” to retire crop acres to conservation uses, farmers could be paid for the percentage of acreage that is dedicated to
more than two different agricultural uses (such as grain crops and livestock). Second, the concept of “base crops” should be eliminated.
One of the most significant impediments to diversification is the Farm
Bill’s exclusive focus on commodity crops. Everything from conservation program eligibility to income supports are calculated based on
156
acreage dedicated to growing commodity crops.
All acreage used
for agricultural production should be counted for farm program benefits. To avoid overinclusion, programs may limit benefits to house157
holds whose primary income is derived from farming.
These re-

151

See, e.g., RAPP, supra note 16, at 14 (noting that since the 1980s, farm programs
have been the third largest domestic spending item). From the origination of the program through 1960, government payments never exceeded ten percent of farm income. Id. at 15.
152
RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 9.
153
This is not to suggest that polyculture and organic farming are synonymous.
Rather, most organic farms are polycultured because it enables them to farm effectively without chemicals. See POLLAN, supra note 18, at 196-97 (explaining how biodiversity
reduces the need for farm inputs, and even labor, by maximizing automated processes
of nature, such as photosynthesis).
154
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 23.
155
See SCHOONOVER & MULLER, supra note 3, at 4 (recommending policies that
reward production of organic products, and promote perennial agriculture).
156
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 4.
157
Legislatures face challenges in crafting provisions to limit benefits to farming
families because self-employed farmers increasingly supplement household income with
nonfarm work. See RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 3 (estimating that farmers spend up
to forty hours working off the farm on nights and weekends to increase household income). Some farming families may be excluded if benefits are underinclusive.
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forms would enable farmers to diversify production without losing the
safety net of federal income supports in lean years.
D. Amend Conservation Program Benefit Calculations
Conservation programs should credit all acreage used in production, including land that farmers rotate out of production. This proposal would address the conservation programs that attempt to impact
supply but often result in encouraging more intensive use of the same
158
acreage. Indeed, some conservation programs may ultimately harm
the environment because farmers increase inputs such as chemical fer159
tilizers and pesticides to generate the same yield from fewer acres.
As American farmers came to understand during the Dust Bowl, conservation measures are essential to preserving agriculture, as well as to
protecting humans and wildlife who suffer from pollution and envi160
ronmental degradation. However, the way that program benefits are
currently calculated inhibits diversification of agricultural opera161
The 1996 FAIR Act demonstrated this problem when Contions.
gress’s goal to increase market response was thwarted by conservation
benefits and income support programs that retained dependence on
162
program crops.
Thus, it is essential to revise conservation program
benefits calculations so that commodities reforms may be effective.
E. Influence Consumer Choice
Congress should impose a graded excise tax on the least healthy
products, such as those that contain trans fats, hydrogenated oils, ingredients produced in a laboratory rather than on a farm, and products that have insufficient nutrients relative to the amount of calories
163
for a balanced diet.
The goal of this tax would be to increase the
relative expense of these products to enable consumers to make food
choices that are more beneficial to their health while remaining with158

See Christopher R. Kelley, Rethinking the Equities of Federal Farm Programs, 14 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 659, 661 (1994) (explaining that conservationists are concerned with
federal programs that result in greater use of environmentally degrading chemicals).
159
See POLLAN, supra note 18, at 42 (“Before synthetic fertilizers the amount of nitrogen in the soil strictly limited the amount of corn an acre of land could support.”).
160
Cf. HURT, supra note 23, at 84-85 (noting that the first conservation programs
were initiated to protect farms rather than ecology).
161
See RAPP, supra note 16, at 85-86 (explaining that conservation programs illustrate the federal government’s assumption of a significant regulatory role).
162
Olson, supra note 40, at 21.
163
See MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: AN EATER’S MANIFESTO 64 (2008).
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in their budget. Clinical studies show that altering the price of foods
164
significantly impacts consumer food choices.
In addition, processors would be encouraged to reconsider the nutritional value of the
food they create. This concept is similar to the taxation of tobacco
products that has been very successful in reducing smoking in the
165
United States.
Processors would also be encouraged to reconsider
the nutritional value of the food they create and to find innovative
166
new ways to make whole foods less expensive and more convenient.
Merely adding vitamins and minerals to processed foods, such as cal167
cium-enriched cereal, does not achieve this goal.
Similar to tobacco use, highly processed foods impose functional
168
The additional health care
negative externalities on all Americans.
costs due to the excessive consumption of these foods is paid for
through public benefits programs like Medicare and Medicaid,

164

See SCHOONOVER & MULLER, supra note 3, at 8 (commenting on studies that
found reducing food prices by a small amount significantly impacted consumer
choice); Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 14 (pointing to studies where researchers observed changes in food choice based on changing prices in a vending machine). Nutritional science is still developing, and the definition of “healthy food” is
still evolving; however, unprocessed foods are healthier than processed foods, even
when those processed foods have vitamins and minerals added to the final product.
See, e.g., POLLAN, supra note 163, at 76 (“The uncomfortable fact is that the entire field
of nutritional science rests on a foundation of ignorance and lies about the most basic
question of nutrition: What are people eating?”).
165
See Gary S. Backer et al., An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 396, 396 (1994) (concluding that a 10% permanent increase in cigarette prices
reduces consumption by 4% in the short run and 7.5% in the long run).
166
This is a current trend in some large companies, such as McDonald’s, which is
now offering an oatmeal product, and Wal-Mart, which pledged to reduce sugar, saturated fats, and sodium in its processed foods. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Wal-Mart
Takes a Healthy Turn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at B1 (describing Wal-Mart’s five-year
plan to reduce the amount of sodium, sugar, and hydrogenated oils in its processed
foods—-mirroring a pledge by ConAgra to reduce these unhealthy components in its
processed foods). However, many of these attempts are rooted in marketing goals, rather than nutritional science. For example, McDonald’s oatmeal product “contains
more sugar than a Snickers bar and only 10 fewer calories than a McDonald’s cheeseburger or Egg McMuffin.” Mark Bittman, How to Make Oatmeal . . . Wrong, N.Y. TIMES
OPINIONATOR (Feb. 22, 2011, 8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/
02/22/how-to-make-oatmeal-wrong.
167
For example, Michael Pollan has written on studies showing that beta-carotene
supplements do not have the same health benefits as carrots. See POLLAN, supra note
163, at 64.
168
That is not to suggest that McDonald’s should be prohibited from selling junk
food. This Comment merely asserts that the federal government should not directly
subsidize the principal inputs of unhealthy foods and suggests taxing these foods to
reflect their true cost.
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through higher health insurance premiums, and through higher fees
169
charged by hospitals to cover emergency treatment of the uninsured.
Processors such as McDonald’s, ConAgra, and Kraft Foods do not
bear the health costs of their products. Instead these health costs are
170
While federal
paid for by consumers, taxpayers, and the insured.
courts consistently dismiss claims against McDonald’s for imposing
health costs on consumers, these opinions are principally based on
the contention that consumers know, or should know, that fast food
has health risks, so the consumers assumed these risks when choosing
171
to eat at McDonald’s.
The problem is that even for an informed
consumer the choice is skewed because the food is artificially inexpensive. If consumers were presented with the actual cost of the food
at the time of purchase, it would be much easier to make informed
172
eating decisions.
In the long run, an 800-calorie candy bar costs
173
much more than the $1 sticker price.
Two concerns arise when proposing measures to selectively increase food prices. First, increasing food prices could hurt low174
income families who are already food insecure. For example, advo169

See Finkelstein et al., supra note 4, at w828 (describing how health care costs are
spread across the population). Absent insurance and public benefits individual, consumers could be expected to bear the entire cost of their food choices. However, indirect costs due to reduced productivity, increased disability, and the use of limited health
care services to treat obesity, heart disease, and diabetes would still impact all Americans.
170
The direct health care costs of obesity are estimated at $147 billion per year,
which are paid by consumers who need the medical treatment, taxpayers who fund
Medicaid and Medicare, and those with health insurance who pay higher insurance
premiums in order to cover medical costs of those who develop obesity-related conditions. Id. Beyond these direct costs, there are also indirect costs due to lost productivity and the decline in the quality of life of those impacted by the abundance of artificially inexpensive junk food. See id. at w831 (asserting that reforms to address these
indirect costs “will require policy and environmental changes that extend far beyond
what can be achieved through changes in health care financing and delivery”).
171
See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 541-42 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (finding that because the dangers of McDonald’s food are “open and obvious,”
McDonald’s could not be liable for failure to warn). But cf. Reyes v. McDonald’s Corp.,
Nos. 06-1604, 06-2813, 2006 WL 3253579, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2006) (denying a motion to dismiss Reyes’ a claim that McDonald’s fraudulently advertised false caloric and
fat content information for its french fries, inducing Reyes to consume french fries
more frequently than she would have with the correct information).
172
See Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that price can have a
significant impact on consumer choice).
173
Cf. K.M. Venkat Narayan et al., Lifetime Risk for Diabetes Mellitus in the United
States, 290 JAMA 1884, 1887-88 (2003) (estimating that the lifetime risk of diagnosed
diabetes in the United States is about one in three for men and two in five for women).
174
USDA data shows that low-income households spend nearly forty percent of
their income on food, while high-income households spend only nine percent of their
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cates for the poor were highly critical of New York Mayor Michael
Bloomberg’s proposed pilot program prohibiting the purchase of so175
da with food stamps. Increasing food prices is a serious problem for
low-income families and the goal of these legislative recommendations
176
is to make healthy food choices more affordable. An increase in the
production of fruits, vegetables, and whole grains will reduce their
cost just as excessive production of commodity crops has reduced the
cost of those food products. Moreover, additional food stamp benefits
could be provided with funds not spent on crop subsidies or with rev177
enues from taxing highly processed foods.
It is true that soda and potato chips will become more expensive:
that is the goal. Soda and fried foods are luxury items to be enjoyed
infrequently but have become integrated into the basic American di178
et.
The long-term objective is to use pricing to reflect the fact that
179
soda and french fries are luxury foods, not staples of a daily diet.
Thus, individuals who choose to continue to consume principally
these foods will face higher food prices, just as those who continue to
smoke cigarettes face higher tobacco prices. The purpose of this rec-

income on food. Elizabeth Frazão et al., Converging Patterns in Global Food Consumption
and Food Delivery Systems, AMBER WAVES, Feb. 2008, at 22, 24.
175
See Anemona Hartocollis, Food Stamps as New Front in Soda Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
7, 2010, at A1 (reporting that advocates were concerned food stamp beneficiaries were
being singled out in a stigmatizing fashion and suggesting an educational program to
reduce soda consumption). The proposed legislation seeks to avoid that pitfall. However, low-income people will face more food choice constraints as highly processed
food becomes more expensive.
176
If this goal is realized, then low-income families will spend less money on
health care, ideally saving money in the long-run. See Sherry et al., supra note 4, at 952
(noting that obese adults are “at increased risk for many serious health conditions,”
which will result in an estimated cost of billions of dollars).
177
Researchers have found that simply increasing food stamp benefits does not
increase fruit and vegetable consumption and have suggested supplemental vouchers
or coupons that can only be spent on fruits and vegetables. JOANNE F. GUTHRIE ET AL.,
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. INFO. BULL. NO. 29-1, CAN FOOD
STAMPS DO MORE TO IMPROVE FOOD CHOICES? 3 (2007).
178
In food surveys Americans report spending most of their money on items the
USDA labels “other foods,” including, processed foods, condiments, desserts, nonalcoholic beverages, and snacks. ELIZABETH FRAZAO ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. INFO. BULL. NO. 29-4, FOOD SPENDING PATTERNS OF LOWINCOME HOUSEHOLDS: WILL INCREASING PURCHASING POWER RESULT IN HEALTHIER
FOOD CHOICES? 2 fig.1 (2007).
179
This Comment does not propose regulating the sale of processed foods, but
rather questions the wisdom of spending billions of dollars directly subsidizing its cost.
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ommendation is to make whole foods less expensive and more afford180
able for all families.
The second objection questions the role of government in shap181
ing consumer attitudes toward food. Political commentators such as
Julie Grunlock have voiced opposition to Michelle Obama’s “Let’s
Move!” campaign because they believe parents should be free to make
182
food choices for their children without government interference.
Grunlock contends that parents can be educated on healthy and unhealthy foods and then make decisions that are best for their own
183
families.
However, a recent study found that calorie information
posted on a restaurant menu under new laws had no impact on food
184
The relative price of foods has been found to significantly
choice.
185
impact food choice. Moreover, the government already significantly
impacts consumption by directly subsidizing certain foods, and regulating the consumption of tobacco, alcohol, and narcotics.
If critics like Grunlock are correct, then reversing the current incentive structure of food, where the least expensive food is the least
healthy, will enable consumers to make food choices based on their
186
family’s nutritional needs, rather than just its budget.
This proposed legislation will level the price-per-calorie playing field to pro180

While food prices have been increasing over the course of 2011, soda is not
properly characterized as “food.” The stigma that Mayor Bloomberg’s plan imposes on
food stamp recipients is problematic, but limiting overall access to soda is not. This goal
is also no more paternalistic than limiting consumers’ access to cigarettes. Just like tobacco products, all Americans end up paying for the ill effects of poor food.
181
This objection loses force since the government currently plays an important role
in food choice by subsidizing the production of certain foods. Further, consumer choice
is more directly impacted through regulation of tobacco, alcohol, and narcotics. Finally,
the federal government actively markets certain food products directly to consumers.
182
Julie Grunlock, Federalizing Fat, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 9, 2010, 4:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229099/federalizing-fat/julie-gunlock.
183
Id.
184
See Brian Elbel, Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects On
Low-Income People in New York City, 28 HEALTH AFF. w1110, w1117 (2009),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/6/w1110.full.pdf+html (finding no evidence that menu labeling influenced the total number of calories purchased).
185
See Neil Gandal & Anastasia Shabelansky, Obesity and Price Sensitivity at the
Supermarket, 13 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y no. 2, 2010, at 4, http://
www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1191&context=fhep (concluding that
price sensitivity is the most important factor in food choice).
186
A twenty percent increase in the price of beverages with added sugars could reduce the percentage of at-risk-of-overweight and overweight American children by five
and three percent, respectively. TRAVIS A. SMITH ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., TAXING CALORIC SWEETENED BEVERAGES: POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON BEVERAGE CONSUMPTION, CALORIE INTAKE, AND OBESITY, at iii-iv (2010).
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vide consumers with a more viable option: comparing apples to apples, rather than apples to subsidized corn chips.
III. LEGAL HURDLES TO IMPLEMENTING REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS
There are three possible constitutional objections to these rec187
First, eliminating commodity price supports would
ommendations.
function as a revocation of entitlements to government benefits sub188
Second, regulating the use of
ject to due process requirements.
agricultural land may rise to the level of a regulatory taking if the reg189
ulation sufficiently impacts the value of the property.
Finally, reforms may be beyond Congress’s authority to regulate interstate
190
When the Supreme Court invalidated the Agricultural
commerce.
Adjustment Act of 1933 in Butler, it found the act’s production tax and
payments for acreage reduction to be “coercive” uses of the power to
191
tax and spend. The more recent holdings in Lopez and Morrison raise
192
new concerns about the scope of Congress’s Article I authority.
A. Due Process Challenges to Proposed Legislation
Price supports are an entitlement program, similar to social security and welfare: an individual who qualifies for benefits has a right to
those benefits. In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Amendment prohibits deprivation of rights to government bene193
The defendants in Goldberg conceded that
fits without due process.
the plaintiff had a property interest in welfare benefits under the So-

187

These objections are in addition to the political hurdles beyond the scope of this
Comment.
188
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1970) (requiring the Social Security
Administration to provide an oral hearing prior to terminating disability benefits).
189
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (denying the claim that restrictions on the construction of a fifty-story office tower on top of
Grand Central Station constituted a taking because it did not deprive the property of
all economic use, was for a legitimate public purpose, and did not interfere with a reasonable investment-backed expectation).
190
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1936) (declaring the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 unconstitutional because agricultural production is exclusively
a local concern).
191
Id.
192
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act as beyond Commerce Clause authority because it regulated
noncommercial activity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (finding the
Gun-Free School Zones Act beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause authority).
193
397 U.S. at 261-62.
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194

cial Security Act. Not until Board of Regents v. Roth did the Court determine that government benefits constitute a property right when an
individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement grounded in a non195
constitutional source of law.
Although Roth failed to demonstrate
196
that he was entitled to a renewed teaching contract, the plaintiff in
the companion case Perry v. Sindermann showed sufficient evidence
that there may have been a tacit system of tenure, creating an implicit
197
right to entitlement.
Since Goldberg, courts have recognized government entitlements as property, and if plaintiffs meet the Roth legitimate claim of entitlement standard, the revocation or denial of an
198
entitlement creates due process concerns.
While Goldberg rested on a statutory entitlement, the Roth court
held that any nonconstitutional source of law could provide a basis for
199
The Roth holding emphasized
a legitimate claim for entitlement.
the issue of reliance:
It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims
upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing
200
to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.

Sindermann echoed the importance of reasonable reliance by
holding that no written rule or law is required to give rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement, so long as there is a clear expectation justi201
fied by the circumstances. This standard opens the door to a potential challenge by farmers who have relied on federal farm payments to
supplement their income. For many farms, agricultural supports con-

194

See id. (“Appellant does not contend that procedural due process is not applicable to the termination of welfare benefits. Such benefits are a matter of entitlement
for persons qualified to receive them.”).
195
See 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it . . . . He must, instead,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”).
196
Id. at 578.
197
408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972).
198
The Court in Roth distinguished between statutory and constitutional grounds
for entitlements in rejecting Roth’s argument that his entitlement was grounded in
the First Amendment right to free speech (he was allegedly fired for speaking out
against the school’s administration). 408 U.S. at 575 n.14. The Court explained that
“[w]hatever may be a teacher’s rights of free speech, the interest in holding a teaching
job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest.” Id.
199
Id. at 577.
200
Id.
201
408 U.S. at 602-03.
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202

stitute the majority of household income.
Could this be sufficient
203
reliance to warrant procedural safeguards?
Goldberg illustrates the potential consequences of repealing a statutory benefits program. While a tacit entitlement can create a property
right under Sindermann, the repeal of the program altogether eliminates the basis for that property right—whether it is the termination
of a de facto tenure program or the repeal of entitlements issued
204
through the Social Security Act or the Farm Bill.
For example the
Social Security Act was amended to increase the retirement age at
205
Younger workers had no
which individuals recieve full benefits.
claim to entitlement because the statute no longer provided them
206
Similarly, when the FAIR Act ended price
with a right to benefits.
supports through deficiency payments, due process issues did not invalidate the act. Although the FAIR Act maintained income supports,
it entirely revoked entitlements that comprised over half of total farm
207
payments prior to the Act.
Based on the success of these changes,
ending price support programs should not pose a constitutional problem under the Due Process Clause.
B. Regulating Agricultural Use of Land and Just Compensation
The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on taking property without
208
just compensation has been extended to include regulatory takings
where a restriction on land use reduces its value so dramatically that it
209
requires compensation.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York

202

See RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 2 (“For grain farmers, government payments can—-depending on the year—-represent all (or more than all) of their net
farm income.”).
203
For a discussion of the degree of due process that is required, see Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976), which establishes a balancing test to determine what
kinds of procedures are required to legitimately deny an individual a property interest.
204
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 251, 262-65 (1970) (emphasizing that the eligibility for benefits, as defined by the statute, is what supports the claim to entitlement).
205
See 42 U.S.C. § 416(I)(1)(A)–(D) (2006) (increasing the retirement age by three
months per year, from sixty-five years in 2000 to sixty-seven years in 2021).
206
Indeed, an extensive case law search revealed no cases challenging the 1983
amendments on due process grounds.
207
See Ahearn et al., supra note 81, at 9 (analyzing the effects of the introduction
of decoupled payments on farm purchasing behavior).
208
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
209
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (striking down a Pennsylvania law prohibiting coal mining under a residence in a manner that would endan-
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City defined the modern taking doctrine as a balancing test.
The
Court considered the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations of the property holder, the character of
the government action, and the regulation’s role in promoting “the
211
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”
The case concerned an
historic landmark law, which prohibited a proposed office tower con212
The ordinance did not imstruction above Grand Central Station.
pact current and expected use of the property, nor did it prohibit all
213
The Court concluded that the regulaconstruction in the airspace.
tions did not amount to a taking because the regulations were “substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare” and also
214
“permit[ted] reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site.”
Agricultural regulations more often limit land use than prevent
215
construction. For example, the Washington State Department of
Wildlife issued a regulation prohibiting possession, breeding, or sale of
216
elk. In Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, an elk farmer challenged the ordinance as a taking because it deprived him of the economic value of
217
the land. The court disagreed, finding that the regulation did not result in a total deprivation of economic use, and its protection of wildlife
218
was “one of the state’s most important interests.” Thus, farmers may
be prohibited from engaging in certain agricultural practices, even if
such regulation interferes with the current economic use of their land.

ger the structural stability of the home, because the regulation effectively revoked the
mining rights without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
210
438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
211
Id. at 125.
212
Id. at 107.
213
Id. at 136-37.
214
Id. at 138.
215
However, environmental regulations are often challenged as a taking when
they prohibit construction on uninhabited property. See, e.g., Broadwater Farms Joint
Venture v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 154, 156 (1999) (determining that an order to
restore eleven lots in the plaintiff’s housing development to wetlands under the Clean
Water Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the plaintiff had notice of this
possibility before he purchased the land, and the Act promoted public welfare). But
see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992) (finding that South
Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act prohibiting the plaintiff from constructing any
buildings was a taking because it deprived the owner of all economic use of the land,
and went into effect after he had purchased the lots).
216
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 232-12-064(2) (2005).
217
940 P.2d 274, 275-76 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
218
Id. at 278-79.
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Farm conservation measures have faced similar takings challenges.
219
An Iowa soil erosion regulation required one farmer to remove
cropland from production and to spend more than $12,000 to meet
220
erosion standards. The court in Woodbury Soil Conservation District v.
Ortner did not find that this imposition violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, because soil erosion was an important state interest, and
221
the cost to the defendant was “one the state has a right to exact.”
The court further posited that “[a] law does not become unconstitu222
tional because it works a hardship.”
An economic imposition alone is insufficient to constitute a tak223
ing.
A farmer must demonstrate that a reasonable investmentbacked expectation will be destroyed. Prohibiting an entire agricultural use did not result in a taking under Schreiner Farms because the
224
land could be used for other economic purposes. Even permanently removing parts of agricultural land from production and requiring
financial investment in infrastructure did not rise to the level of a taking in Ortner, because “[d]efendants still have the use and enjoyment
of their property, limited only by the necessity to prevent soil erosion
225
beyond allowable standards.”
This line of cases suggests that regulating agricultural production is not a taking because, as in Schreiner
Farms, the land subject to this regulation may be put to other kinds of
agricultural use. Absent a showing of physical invasion or total deprivation of economic use, a court will consider whether there is a suffi226
cient public interest to justify the taking.
Both environmental protection and public health are sufficient interests to support
227
regulations. Indeed the court in Ortner wrote, “It should take no extended discussion to demonstrate that agriculture is important to the
welfare and prosperity of this state. It has been judicially recognized

219

IOWA CODE ANN. § 467A.49 (West 1974).
Woodbury Cnty. Soil Conservation Dist. v. Ortner, 279 N.W.2d 276, 277
(Iowa 1979).
221
Id. at 279.
222
Id. (citing Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Huff, 256 N.W.2d 17, 25 (Iowa 1977)).
223
Id.
224
940 P.2d at 279. The court explained, “Schreiner Farms has failed to establish
that [the regulation] destroyed or derogated a fundamental attribute of property ownership, in particular, the regulation did not amount to a ‘total taking.’” Id.
225
279 N.W.2d at 279.
226
Schreiner Farms, 940 P.2d at 277.
227
See Ortner, 279 N.W.2d at 278 (“The state has a vital interest in protecting its soil
as the greatest of its natural resources, and it has a right to do so.”).
220
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228

Thus Fifth Amendment concerns do not
as our leading industry.”
impose any barriers to regulating agricultural production.
C. Congressional Authority to Regulate Agricultural
Production and Consumption
Congress has regulated agricultural production under its Commerce Clause authority since the 1936 Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court held that
the Commerce Clause reaches any activity that in the aggregate exerts
229
substantial effects on national markets.
This ruling effectively overturned Butler, which struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
230
In Butler the Court held that
1933 as beyond Congress’s authority.
Congress did not have the authority to regulate agricultural production under the Commerce Clause because agricultural production was
231
Now that the limits of the Commerce
an exclusively local concern.
Clause have been reasserted in Lopez and Morrison, is there room to
challenge Wickard? For regulation beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause, can Congress turn to the Taxing and Spending Clause
to authorize the proposed legislation?
1. Limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause
Authority After Lopez and Morrison
In Wickard, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the mandatory wheat production limitations imposed by the 1936 Soil Conserva232
tion Act. The Court determined that growing wheat was a commercial activity and could be regulated even when a farmer did not sell
233
The purpose of the legislation was to influence
most of his crop.
national wheat prices by controlling supply, and when Filburn grew
228

Id. (citing Benschoter v. Hakes, 8 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Iowa 1943)).
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). The Court explained that “even if appellee’s activity
may be local and though it not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce.” Id.
230
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1936).
231
Id. at 73.
232
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115 (“The general scheme of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as related to wheat is to control the volume moving in interstate and
foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and the consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to commerce.”).
233
See id. at 124 (“Whether the subject of the regulation in question was ‘production,’ ‘consumption,’ or ‘marketing’ is, therefore, not material for purposes of deciding the question of federal power before us.”).
229
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and consumed wheat on his own farm beyond the maximum quota,
he added wheat to the national supply that he would have otherwise
234
purchased to feed his cattle.
Even if the amount of wheat that Filburn grew would not on its own affect national commerce, similar ac235
tions of other farmers would have an impact in the aggregate. Thus,
Congress could regulate production of agricultural goods grown for
personal consumption.
The Supreme Court consistently reaffirmed this interpretation of
236
the Commerce Clause over the following five decades. However, in
1995 the Court limited the seemingly boundless commerce authority
in determining that Congress could not regulate gun possession on or
237
near school grounds.
As in Butler, the Court in Lopez found the regulated area to be a state prerogative holding that Congress could not
regulate the activity absent a showing it had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, or a connection to the channels of interstate
238
commerce. The Court echoed this holding five years later in Morrison. The Violence Against Women Act challenged in Morrison included lengthy congressional findings on the economic impact of vi239
olence against women. The Court determined that violence itself is
not an economic activity, which is why its economic effect cannot be
240
Lopez was
aggregated to show an impact on interstate commerce.
similarly grounded in the finding that gun possession near schools was

234

See id. at 127 (“The effect of consumption of home-grown wheat on interstate
commerce is due to the fact that it constitutes the most variable factor in the disappearance of the wheat crop.”).
235
Id. at 127-28.
236
See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981) (holding that
congressional power to regulate mining under the Commerce Clause extended to regulating surface coal mining operations, because pollution may have effects on more than
one state); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971) (upholding a prohibition
of loan sharking through threats of violence because in the aggregate this activity supports organized crime, even if the particular defendant did not have ties to organized
crime); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights
Act in an enforcement action against a restaurant that only served in-state customers, because a substantial portion of the restaurant’s food had moved in interstate commerce).
237
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). The statute still remains in
force, although it now applies only to firearms known to have traveled through or affected interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006).
238
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
239
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-15 (2000) (citing H. R. Conf. Rep.
No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 40 (1993); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at
33 (1990)).
240
See id. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity.”).
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not an economic activity.
Justice Stevens offered a persuasive dissenting
opinion asserting that guns are articles of commerce falling within Congress’s
242
regulatory authority.
In this sense, Lopez and Morrison leave Wickard unaltered because growing wheat was a patently economic activity, and thus its impact on interstate commerce may be aggregated.
In 2005 the Supreme Court echoed the Wickard holding in Gonzales v. Raich, in which respondent Angel Raich challenged the Controlled Substances Act’s prohibition of medical marijuana grown for
243
The Court held that marijuana was a marpersonal consumption.
ketable commodity, and when it traveled in interstate commerce there
was no means of distinguishing marijuana legally grown for personal
medical use and commercial marijuana sold for illegal recreational
244
use. Thus, even though the marijuana Raich grew had not traveled
in interstate commerce, as in Wickard, the economic activity in the aggregate affected interstate commerce, and consequently Congress
245
could regulate it. Similarly, agricultural products, even those grown
for home consumption or sold to in-state producers, affect the national market for grains and produce. Raich is an important reminder
of the difference between Congress’s authority to regulate commercial
and noncommercial activities articulated in Lopez and Morrison. Most
significantly, Raich confirms that raising agricultural products is most
certainly an economic activity and thus can be regulated by Congress.
2. Regulating Consumption Under the Taxing and Spending Clause
While agricultural production can be regulated under the modern Commerce Clause doctrine, regulating consumption is not a
clearly enumerated power under Article I. Yet, Congress is permitted
to condition federal funding on meeting federal policy objectives,
246
even if it does not have authority to directly regulate in that area.
241

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
Id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243
545 U.S. 1, 12-20 (2005).
244
Id.
245
Id. at 18-19. The Court reasoned that “[t]he similarities between this case and
Wickard are striking. . . . In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress’
commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the
national market for that commodity.” Id.
246
As the Court stated in South Dakota v. Dole,
242

“[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for
public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power
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For example, the federal government created a minimum drinking
age of twenty-one by offering federal highway funding to states that
impose this standard. In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court held that
Congress may use the power to tax and spend as an incentive for states
to adopt policies that Congress cannot directly regulate, provided that
247
such inducements are not coercive. However, the Butler Court held
that the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act program payments were
conditioned on compliance and thus were not voluntary: “The
amount offered is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on [far248
There were two commers] to agree to the proposed regulation.”
ponents to this holding. The first concerned marketing agreements,
whereby processors voted in a referendum to limit total supply, and
any producer who did not comply with the production quota was
taxed at such a rate that it amounted to a confiscation of the excess
249
crops. The Court held that raising revenue was clearly a pretext for
250
regulation, and the tax imposed was the penalty for noncompliance.
Second, the revenues raised through this penalizing taxation were of251
fered to farmers who complied with the acreage-reduction program.
These payments created incentives beyond Congress’s taxation authori252
The Court applied a more relaxed
ty because they were coercive.
standard of coercion in Dole finding that withholding five percent of the
state’s federal funding for failure to impose a minimum drinking age

found in the Constitution.” Thus, objectives not thought to be within
Article I’s “enumerated legislative fields,” may nevertheless be attained
through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.
483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 65-66 (1936)).
247
Id. In addition to the limitation on coercion, the spending must be for the
“general welfare” and Congress must unambiguously state any condition of funding.
Finally, the conditions imposed on receipt of the funds must be related “to the federal
interest in particular national projects or programs.” Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts
v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
248
Butler, 297 U.S. at 70-71.
249
Olson, supra note 40, at 6; see also supra subsection I.B.3.
250
Butler, 297 U.S. at 69-70.
251
Id. at 70-71.
252
See id. at 71 (“The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power
to coerce or destroy. If the cotton grower elects not to accept the benefits, he will receive less for his crops; those who receive payments will be able to undersell him. The
result may well be financial ruin.”). The Court then noted that the program was not
particularly successful at coercing compliance. See supra Part I.
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did not “pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”
More recently, the Seventh Circuit held that the federal Swampbuster
program (denying benefits to farmers who converted wetlands to agri254
cultural production)
was not unconstitutionally coercive, and by denying certiori the Supreme Court may have indicated that it was not yet
255
willing to disturb the circuit court’s conclusion.
The best model for tax-based consumption disincentives is tobacco taxation. Tobacco excise taxes are framed as revenue-raising provisions, although they have a significant impact on tobacco consumption. For example, the largest increase in federal tobacco taxes was
passed as a funding measure in the 2009 Children’s Health Insurance
256
Program Reauthorization Act (CHIP). This statute increased feder257
al tobacco taxes from $0.39 per pack of cigarettes to $1.01 per pack.
Studies show that every ten percent increase in cigarette tax results in
258
While smoking cessation
a four percent decrease in tobacco use.
was the policy purpose of the financing provision, the measure was
framed purely as a revenue-raising effort, avoiding any of the constitutional questions that arose in Butler. Moreover, cigarettes are not
taxed to the extent of confiscation. Imposing excise taxes on highly
processed foods could be implemented as a financing measure in a
259
number of federal statutes, as was done in CHIP.
Therefore, if
there is sufficient political will, there is no constitutional barrier to
encouraging better food production and consumption through excise
taxes.
CONCLUSION
The federal government alone cannot reverse obesity and related
diseases, but it may encourage certain behavior to make it possible for
families to make healthier food choices. Beyond improving public
253

483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
590 (1937)).
254
16 U.S.C. §§ 3821–3824 (2006).
255
Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1018 (2006).
256
§ 701, I.R.C. § 5701 (Supp. III 2010).
257
See id. § 701(b), I.R.C. § 5701(b) (increasing taxes from $19.55 to $50.33 per
thousand cigarettes).
258
Steady Increases in Tobacco Taxes Promote Quitting, Discourage Smoking, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/Features/SecondhandSmoke (last visited
Oct. 15, 2011).
259
For example, some costs of the Affordable Care Act could be offset with taxes on
disease-causing processed foods in order to further reduce national healthcare costs.
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health, the key question is whether taxpayers should spend twenty billion dollars each year to reduce the cost of highly processed, lownutrition foods. Current farm programs push farmers to intensively
cultivate millions of acres of the same crop and make it less expensive
to purchase feed grain than to grow it on the farm. These are not issues of economies of scale, but are the direct result of the government
paying the difference between the cost of production and a much
lower market price. Eliminating these price supports and coupled income payments seems to be an obvious policy choice, but determining
which legislative measures would produce the desired effects is a more
complex problem.
While nutritional programs and health initiatives are beginning to
address consumer food choice, the most direct consumer incentive is
260
prices, not educational programs alone. Income supports need to
actually support farm income, not prices, and should be decoupled
from production. Polyculture is an important way to stabilize farm income, while increasing the supply of produce and lowering the cost to
consumers. Finally, requiring processed food manufacturers to internalize the costs they impose on consumers will alleviate consumer
choice between short-term food costs and long-term health care costs.
These reforms will reduce the relative cost of healthy foods as compared to unhealthy foods, enabling consumers to make good nutritional and financial choices. It is imperative that the 2012 Farm Bill
alter production trends and consumer habits in order to address this
national health crisis.

260

See Gandal & Shabelansky, supra note 185, at 10 (showing that price sensitivity is
an important influence on food choice).

